Mass Protests in Ecuador , What Else is New?

Throughout its history, Ecuadorian democracy has been plagued with instability. Regionalism and personalism have been defining features of the political culture, and ethnic and class division have prompted political parties to behave as electoral machines in vying for segments of the elite. When democracy returned in 1979, ineptitude, corruption, and party splits followed. Attempts at important reforms stalled in highly fragmented Congresses where vested interests came before policy making. The country’s inefficient policymaking process has vastly inhibited the success of policy initiatives and left the country vulnerable to external shocks (natural disaster, oil exports, high levels of foreign debt, etc).

These trends, along with economic problems, have likely encouraged Ecuadorians to back anti-party, populist leaders such as Mr. Correa. But the appeal is almost always short-lived. This past week, tens of thousands took to the streets of the industrial hub city Guayaquil to send a message of opposition to the president’s reform agenda. It seems likely that any power consolidating efforts by Correa this May will be vocally rejected by the populous. But historically, isn’t this a recurring theme? Ecuador has not been able to find equilibrium for many years and this suggests a systemic problem.

Under such circumstances it’s hard not to see the merit in the argument for a Parliamentary system vs. the current Presidential system. Perhaps a majoritarian model in the fashion of Great Britain would not be in the cards for such a polarized and volatile country. However, a New Zealand model, where coalitions and minority governments are quite common, may dampen personalist appeals and populist rhetoric. Each of the many minority factions could attain representation in the Parliament, unpopular demagogues could be ousted within the normal operation of government, and there could be much greater incentives for cooperation. As we know, Parliamentary governments are hierarchical, not transactional. This is a key point: the various interests in Equator have proven they cannot transact with one another very well. While the NZ model may not be a perfect solution, it will least give more incentives to cooperate while allowing a government to be taken down without all the drama we see playing out year after year, President after President. Fixed-terms can offer stability under more civilized circumstances but are perhaps too rigid for this country as it tries to find its own way to democracy.

Chavez’s Constitutional vs. Partisan Power

The two sources of Presidential strength (from Shuggart and Mainwaring) are Constitutional provisions and partisan support. In the case of Venezuela, Chavez’s presidential power has stemmed mainly from his dominating party control and legislative majority. As the Miami Herald reports, “Chavez’s supporters hold 160 of the 167 seats in Congress and 20 of the 24 state governorships. The judicial system, the Central Bank and the military rarely deviate from his line.” Fortunately, Venezuelans rejected expanding Presidential powers (and abolishing term limits) in the December 2nd Constitutional referendum, reflecting a decline in Chavez’s popularity and his ability to promulgate his own agenda.

A critical editorial prior to the referendum by Raúl Isaías Baduel (former Commander-in-chief of the Venezuelan Army until 20 04) exposes many of the faults in Chavez’s political undertakings and reasons why some of his closest supporters now question their allegiance. Isaías ultimately blames the Venezuelan people themselves for being courted by Chavez’s populism. Despite the referendum setback, Chavez has made Venezuela almost a quintessential “delegative democracy” as he dominates the party with personalism, is relatively unaccountable to congress and the judiciary, and becomes the sole person responsible for “his” policies. http://www.miamiherald.com/news/americas/story/386580.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/01/opinion/01baduel.html?ex=1354251600&en=d83421c8f2dca455

Brazil bans nuclear technology exports to Iran

http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN2246206020070222

According to recent events reported in this Reuters article, Lula has exercised his decree power to stop any commerce that has Iran and nuclear in the same sentence. So what does this mean? A common argument in regards to presidential systems is how there is this deadlock between the different branches, or checks, that really makes policy enactment difficult. Yet the power of presidential decree in Brazil changes the whole game. By alleviating the gridlock of a presidential system, presidential decrees can speed up the policy making process, and therefore be a great help in moving a country forward.

From Mainwaring and Shugart’s Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate, we see that there is “tremendous variation in presidents’ legislative powers” and that “proactive powers” are one way a president can form a new status quo, whether it be in regards to foreign policy or commanding the armed forces. In Brazil, the presidential decrees have provisional measures that lose efficacy if the Congress does not approve them within 30 days. Even though there are provisional measures, the president can use the decrees strategically to shape legislation in several ways which is brought up in the Mainwaring and Shugart chapter previously referenced: First, the presidential decree is immediately the law and therefore this is said to be “changing the status quo.” Secondly, the president can flood Congress with decrees so that they are unable to keep up with adequate consideration of each one. Lastly, that the president can emit a decree on an issue which congress is on the fence about, ultimately getting approval since there is no congressional majority for or against the decree. Therefore, not all presidential systems are the same when it comes to gridlock, especially when presidential decree is a normal method of operation for the president. In this example, Lula wants to cut off any transactions with Iran, whether preempted by the UN or not. It could be said that due to the nature of this issue, there wouldn’t be much of an opposition. But still, in comparing a presidential system which utilizes presidential decree and one that does not, the policy environment varies.

Makeup of Chilean Democracy

Political History of Chile Timeline (Smith):
1900-23 oligarchic
1924-32 nondemocratic
1933-72 democratic
1973-88 nondemocratic
1989-2000 democratic

The US State Department classifies Chile as a republic government. The Chilean government is constructed similar to the United States. The Chilean government is made up of a constitution promulgated in 1980 and three branches: the executive, legislative and judicial.
EXECUTIVE
The President is elected by popular vote in four-years terms. The President cannot serve consecutive terms. The President appoints the cabinet.
LEGISLATIVE
The legislative branch is made up of the bicameral National Congress: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate is made up of 38 members and the Chamber of Deputies is made up of 120 members. Senators serve eight-year terms and Deputies serve 4-year terms.
JUDICIAL
The Judicial branch is much of a constitutional Tribunal, Supreme Court, court of appeals and military courts. The President appoints the 21 Supreme Court judges which are then ratified by the Senate. The court members self elect the president. Chile overhauled its criminal justice system in 2005 and replaced inquisitorial proceedings with an adversarial system similar to the United States.
VOTING
Voting rights are granted to all Chilean citizens at age 18.
REPRESENTATIVES
Chile is split into 14 regions plus the Santiago metropolitan region which are administered by appointed “intendentes”. These regions are divided into provinces administered by appointed governors. Provinces are further divided into municipalities administered by elected mayors.
PARTIES and COALITIONS
Political parties mostly belong to one of two coalitions: the Concertacion and the Alliance for Chile. The Concertaction is the center-left coalition and includes the Christian Democrat Party, the Socialist Party, the Party for Democracy and the Radical Social Democratic Party. The Alliance for Chile is the center-right coalition and includes the National Renewal Party and the Independent Democratic Union. A new center-left party, “Chile-First” was just established in October 2007. The Communist and Humanistic Parties formed a new coalition in 2004 called “Together We Can” but have not elected any representatives to Congress.
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
Members of the legislature are elected from a binomial system based on coalition slates. Coalitions slate two candidates for the two Senate and two Chamber of Deputy seats for each electoral district. Usually Concertacion and Alianza split seats in a district. A coalition will only win both seats when they out-poll the other by a margin of more than 2-to-1.

Source:
US State Department

Party System Institutionalization in Bolivia

President Morales is the founder of a relatively new political party, the Movement towards Socialism (MAS) that has its roots in a social movement among the indigenous peasantry and coca growers. Bolivia has had a multiparty system in which cross-party coalitions have been necessary to govern. This democratic space allowed Morales to organize his followers, establish a legal political party, compete in elections, hold seats in the legislature. MAS has steadily and dramatically built popular support. He was elected to congress in 1997. MAS and Morales won 21% of the vote in the 2002 election, which was good enough for a close second (to Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada’s 22.5%). They won 53.7% of the vote in the 2005, and Morales became the president without presidential election for the first time in its history. (Bolivia’s system is called “parliamentarized presidentialism”, under which congress selects the president when no candidate obtains a majority of the popular vote.)

Unlike Chávez, who came to power with strong personal support, but little initial organizational backing, Morales has both electoral experience and a broad social movement to call upon. (Chávez thus first attempted a military route to power, and then upon being elected six years later, he had almost no party backing.) In Venezuela, Chávez was just getting started politically when he was elected, while the alternative forces that could check him were disintegrating. In Bolivia, by contrast, both the new government and its main opposition have been consolidating their support. Thus, the degree of party system institutionalization is quite different between them, although Morales is often compared to Chavez.

http://fruitsandvotes.com/?cat=58

Energy bill needs PRI support

Mexican president, Felipe Calderon, wants to increase private investment in the struggling energy sector that would provide for a total of $20 billion in development funds for Pemex, Mexico’s state-owned petroleum company.  Calderon states that the investment is necessary for Mexico’s development for the coming decades.  The measure would provide funds towards modernization with $2 billion going towards exploration efforts and $13 billion on production.   

Calderon’s energy reform proposal will need the PRI’s full support in order for it to pass since his party (PAN) lacks a majority in congress.  The PRI have said they are open to talks on revitalizing Pemex but want the legislation to be part of a wider bill that would allow for economic competitiveness and to keep monopolies from forming.  A 2/3 congressional majority is needed for a constitutional change that would allow for privatization.  Currently, there is some internal division within the PRI over the energy reform. 

Getting a 2/3 majority presents a sizable problem that may result in gridlock as we discussed in class.  Going back to the first post, it can be said that the PAN has 41% in each house, but needs 67% and will, therefore, need the support of all PRI members in order to get this passed. This will prove to be difficult considering that term limits as well as lack of re-election cause Mexican politicians to be more shortsighted than those in the parliamentary system who would be more willing to support long term policies in order to secure party predominance in future elections and therefore, the politicians’ own seat. 

More information can be assessed at http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKN2255089720080122?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true

Costa Rican Legislative Process

I took the following from the U.S. State Department website.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2019.htm

It describes the Costa Rican government and a bit about the legislative process.  I highlighted a section that talks about Sala Cuatro (the fourth room).  I am not exactly sure about the specifics but, as I understand, this is a branch of the Judiciary that reviews all legislation passed by the Chamber of Deputies.  I find it interesting because it is so powerful.  It is like an ultimate super veto player with final authority over all legislations.  However the one limit to its authority is that it is purely reactionary, like the U.S. Supreme Court.  If anyone has any insights into Sala Cuatro and its significance please feel free to add comments.

GOVERNMENT
Costa Rica is a democratic republic with a very strong system of constitutional checks and balances. Executive responsibilities are vested in a president, who is the country’s center of power. There also are two vice presidents and a 15-member cabinet. The president and 57 Legislative Assembly deputies are elected for 4-year terms. In April 2003, the Costa Rican Constitutional Court annulled a 1969 constitutional reform which had barred presidents from running for reelection. As a result, the law reverted back to the 1949 Constitution, which permits ex-presidents to run for reelection after they have been out of office for two presidential terms, or eight years. Deputies may run for reelection after sitting out one term, or four years. In October 2007, the country ratified the U.S.-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) by a slender margin in its first national referendum.

The electoral process is supervised by an independent Supreme Electoral Tribunal–a commission of three principal magistrates and six alternates selected by the Supreme Court of Justice. Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice, composed of 22 magistrates selected for renewable 8-year terms by the Legislative Assembly, and subsidiary courts. A Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court (Sala IV), established in 1989, reviews the constitutionality of legislation and executive decrees and all habeas corpus warrants. The next national elections will take place in February 2010.

The offices of the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Solicitor General, and the Ombudsman exercise oversight of the government. The Comptroller General’s office has a statutory responsibility to scrutinize all but the smallest public sector contracts and strictly enforces procedural requirements. Along with the Sala IV, these institutions are playing an increasingly prominent role in governing Costa Rica.

There are provincial boundaries for administrative purposes, but no elected provincial officials. Costa Rica held its first mayoral elections in December 2002, whereby mayors were elected to 4-year terms by popular vote through general elections. Prior to 2002, the office of mayor did not exist, and the president of each municipal council was responsible for the administration of his/her municipality. The most recent nationwide mayoral elections took place in December 2006. Autonomous state agencies enjoy considerable operational independence; they include the telecommunications and electrical power monopoly, the state petroleum refinery, the nationalized commercial banks, the state insurance monopoly, and the social security agency. Costa Rica has no military and maintains only domestic police and security forces. A professional Coast Guard was established in 2000.

Argentina: Coming to terms with its Past

Sorry, I must have messed up last week and this didn’t post properly. 

After the return to democracy in 1983, some of the perpetrators of some of those crimes were tried and sentenced. But subsequently the governments of, firstly, Raul Alfonsin and then Carlos Menem pardoned the military leaders responsible for the terror. They talked about moving on, putting the past behind them. But the Argentine people have not done that. A recent campaign in the continued fight for justice is the “escrache” – a popular denunciation of alleged human rights violators. Last week, several thousand people turned up outside the apartment block where the former military leader, Jorge Rafael Videla, lives. They shouted “murderer” and threw red paint at the building. He may never be brought to justice but the protesters are determined that his retirement, at the very least, will not be a comfortable one. In his prologue to the report Nunca Mas, the Argentine writer Ernesto Sabato said: “It is only democracy which can save a people from horror on this scale.” “Only with democracy, will we be certain that Never Again will events such as these, which have made Argentina so sadly infamous throughout the world, be repeated in our nation.” Argentina is still a nation coming to terms with its past. But with each anniversary of the military coming to power, the confidence that it will not return to that nightmare is growing.

Argentina’s Presidential Decree

Argentina’s President recently used her presidential decree powers in two high profile cases. 

First, and to the dismay of many living in Argentina’s west and south, President Kirchner used a decree to temporarily move all clocks forward one hour starting on December 30^th.  This adjustment, which leaves much of the country under daylight well into the night, is hoped to alleviate Argentina’s power shortages and Buenos Aires’ recent blackouts. 

Then, in a move that will bring the first high speed train to Latin America, President Kirchner used a presidential decree to grant a 1.5 billion dollar contract for a high speed train link between Buenos Aires and Cordoba to a consortium headed by the French company Alstom. 

            These two decrees demonstrate the proactive power afforded to Argentina’s President by the country’s institutions, and more generally, highlight the powers of presidential decrees in presidential systems. The result, in these two cases, has been decisive policy making on two issues calling for quick decisions, although it appears both decisions may have some feeling left out.

For more on these two stories, please see:

http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10566820

http://www.hemscott.com/news/latest-news/item.do?newsId=57266947191808

Riding Uribe’s Wave of Popularity

Support for Uribe is at a record high of 80%, but the results from the municipal elections in October 2007 show that uribista parties aren’t faring quite as well. While uribistas won more gubernatorial and mayoral seats than any other party, they lost the mayoral races in key cities including Bogota. Why aren’t the parties as popular as Uribe?

The presidency is built on the personality and patronage of Uribe rather than a party label. As a defector from the Liberal party, Uribe won his first campaign as an independent and later formed “Partido de la U” around himself. The party is weakly institutionalized, as is the larger coalition, which includes five major parties. There is no reason to think that the party or the coalition will prevail without Uribe. The members are willing to ride the wave of his popularity for now. Yet, a dive in the polls could change his support since there is not a unifying ideology for the group. When it comes time to elect the next president, expect several parties in the coalition to offer candidates.

So, what do the people want in their next president? Well, according to El Tiempo, “The one who gives the most guarantees to the country that they will continue the model of Uribe will win the presidency.” But, without a meaningful party label, how will they know who is most like Uribe? Will they just elect anyone that he endorses? Or, will Uribe change the constitution to run again? Without an institutionalized party system, voters will find it harder to form expectations and hold their leaders accountable. The next president may find himself forming a new party and a new coalition all over again.