The vibrancy of democracy in Venezuela under Chavez

The debate over Hugo Chavez’s commitment to democracy has been well-documented over his tenure as president. This link is to an interesting commentary in the Washington Times from 1999 on the future of Chavez’s presidency, which predicted that he would establish a radical military dictatorship and help radicals take power in other Latin American countries while leading Venezuelans down a path of repression and poverty similar to what has been experienced by Cubans over the last four decades. The author suggested that Chavez’s leadership would undo Venezuela’s transition to democracy. Around the same time, in an address to the nation, Chavez insisted that the rule of law would not be undermined and Venezuela was on the road to democracy. In his speech, Chavez declared, “There is no authoritarian process under way in Venezuela to give absolute power to a single person. In Venezuela, we are not destroying institutions, they were destroyed a long time ago. In Venezuela, most of us are involved in an immense democratic, peaceful, broad and respectful effort to rebuild the institutions, to lay the groundwork for a true democratic republic, to lay the groundwork for a truly free, sovereign and independent country in line with the demands of the 21^st century, a century that is beginning to appear on the horizon.”

Clearly, the situation in Venezuela has not diminished to the level predicted and many are citing the failure of Chavez’s December 2^nd referendum as an indicator of the vibrancy of the democratic process. Recently, 55 members of Britain’s Parliament from five different parties backed a motion that stated that Chavez’s acceptance of the result “once again show how absurd the claims are that Venezuela under Chavez is not a democracy.” This leads to the questions: Is Chavez truly committed to democracy in Venezuela? Is Venezuela a vibrant democracy as the MPs assert or has Chavez’s leadership taken the democratic process in Venezuela backward? Was Chavez’s close defeat in the Constitutional referendum a sign of Venezuela’s commitment to democracy?

Labor unions strategize in the democratization of Brazil?

Labor unions strategize in the democratization of Brazil?

Geddes claims that “most observers of Latin American transitions assign little importance to popular mobilization as a cause of democratization. Popular mobilizations took place in many countries, but they usualy occurred late in the process, when democratization was well underway and the risks of opposition had diminished.” This was true in the case of Brazil as well, demonstrated by a jump from two strikes in 1983 to 42 strikes in 1987. These took place during the peak of democratization when there was less threat of opposition from the military regime and gave strategic labor unions an opportunity to capitalize on the transition to democracy, strengthening future worker’s rights.

Payne (1991) describes the labor unions of Brazil as a “democratic recalcitrant” (motivated by a desire to participate) group, as portrayed by O’Donnell and Shmitter, instead of “maximalist members” (motivated by self-interest) or “opportunistic elements” (motivated by a fear of a coup) groups. This is evident as the labor unions confronted the transitional government and demanded mutually acceptable rules and democratic procedures while insisting that they have the right to participate in the formation of these procedures. They were able to do this as Luis Inacio da Silva (Lula), the president of the Workers Party, was elected to the constituent’s assembly which helped create the new constitution. Beyond Lula, they lacked strong representation in the assembly but lobbied vigorously, drafted an extensive labor legislation proposal (of which many aspects were incorporated into the constitution), and leveraged trade unions, political parties, and lobbyists to work in their favor.

The main idea from Payne’s article (www.jstor.org/view/00104159/ap020092/02a00060/0) was that the labor unions in Brazil were able to participate in the creation of the new constitution because of the economic, political, and organizational environment of the time. But, that they were also able to be influential because of the route they took, acting as a “democratic recalcitrant” organization (prioritizing change but demanding the right to participate) rather than as “maximalist members” (prioritizing self-interest and rioting or using violence) or “opportunistic elements” (motivated by fear of a coup and being acquiescent). This brings about the question, which of these had a greater impact on labor unions ability to have an influence in the political process that created the new constitution? Was it because of the environment of the time or the manner in which labor unions represented themselves? Payne argues that the former may be more accurate and that the “strength of the movement, whether during a political transition or a stable democracy, does not depend on the strategy chosen by the labor movement, but rather on the political, economic, and organizational constraints on it.”

Payne also argues that even though democratization increased freedoms for labor unionists, their ability to act collectively was constrained in three ways.

1) Governments continued control over the working class and employers protection from wage demands

2) The economic crisis prevented many from participating in labor strikes and weakened their public movements

3) The blossoming of new labor unions resulted in pluralism and the representation of many different interests and a lack of unity.

I’m curious to know everyone else’s opinion here… Do you agree with Geddes and Payne that the constraints of the political, economic, and organizational environment limit the strength of a movement? Or can these constraints be faced and overcome without compromising the movement’s agenda?

Brazil Group

Sugar and Clients in Guatemala

The following was taken from the UN Human Development Report written by  Roman Krznaric in 2005.  It documents the power of landed sugar elites in rural Guatemala.  I think this is relevant to our study of Clientelism because it shows that the colonial roots of the modern system are still functioning today.  Krznaric goes on to show that sugar elites actually loan money directly to municipal governments. 

Several factors have helped the sugar barons grow as a political force:

• United in the Guatemalan Sugar Association (ASAZGUA), the elite sugar growing and milling families have become increasingly influential within CACIF during the past decade and have repeatedly held the presidency of the organisation.

• The Guatemalan state has become ever more dependent on the sugar sector as a source of foreign exchange earnings and employment.

• Two of the three Presidents since the end of the civil war (Arzú and Berger) have been members of the economic elite sympathetic to CACIF and the sugar elite, and have appointed business association leaders to cabinet positions.

Krznaric, Roman: The Limits on Pro-Poor Agricultural Trade in Guatemala: Land, Labour and Political Power October 2004 UNDP.

Chile’s Return to Democracy

Following 17 years of authoritarian rule by General Augusto Pinochet, Chile finally returned to civilian rule in 1990.  Contrary to popular theory that political transition usually occurs during economic downturns, in Chile it was the political will of the people which tipped the balance of power, but not in reaction to any economic woes of the time. 

The article linked below was published by Foreign Affairs magazine just after the dictator was voted out of office, and describes Chile’s transition to democratic rule as being “remarkably smooth.”  Much to his surprise, the people voted against another decade of the dictator’s rule in a referendum held in October 1988.  A stunning ninety percent of eligible voters turned out for the referendum that ended Pinochet’s reign by 55 to 43.  Rather than keeping power through force, Pinochet conceded defeat, opening Chile to new democratic presidential elections.

Why this relatively smooth and peaceful transition? The authors give credit to two primary factors: the first is Chile’s “deeply rooted democratic and law-abiding political culture,” and the second is that Chile’s armed forces “remained highly disciplined, professional and uncorrupted.”  The armed forces were sworn to uphold the transition formula written under their own 1980 constitution, and chose not to try and retain control when their commander in chief had been voted out.  It shows a certain commitment by the Chileans (and its army) to institutionalized rules and democratic principles, and Pinochet had to realize that he had lost his ‘supermajority’ he needed to keep grip on the country. 

Also interesting is that by both peacefully conceding power, and not leaving citizens angered by any economic disarray, Pinochet was able to negotiate favorable post-transitional outcomes for himself (Geddes).  Pinochet retained the powerful position as Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army until 1997 and was made senator for life.  The dictator was also able to protect himself from prosecution for the grave human rights abuses that occurred under his rule. 

posted by Chilean Group

 Article link: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19891201faessay5992/pamela-constable-arturo-valenzuela/chile-s-return-to-democracy.html 

For full PDF version of article visit: http://pao.chadwyck.com/articles/search.do?reset=yes and enter article and journal name. 

Source: “Chile’s Return to Democracy”, Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela (Foreign Affairs, Winter 1989/90)

Colombia’s eroded democracy: how much of a change?

Colombia –together with Venezuela and Costa Rica- was a vibrant democracy at the time the rest of Latin America lived under different forms authoritarianism. Despite the exclusionary character of its constitution (Mainwaring et. al. 2005, 44), the country managed to preserve the minimal electoral requisites of a democracy until the FARC, the ELN and other death squads decided to ignore the institutions and took power with violent means. Two events, however, might change our perception of how Colombia is asserting its democratic roots in a context of violence:

 

1)    32 governors and 1099 majors will take office with a huge pressure over their shoulders: as of 2008, local congresses and municipal councils can impeach all heads of government and their closer collaborators. The reform’s aim is to make politicians more accountable to the people and have an instrument to penalize them in cases of maladministration. President Uribe announced a counter-reform to eliminate this prerogative that, according to him, “can be used by capricious politicians every time they feel uncomfortable with the major or governor in turn”. The Congress –of course- announced it would resist the proposed change. (Cambio, Jan 9, 2008). This is an interesting –nonetheless insufficient- step to recover democratic spaces for the citizens of Colombia.

2) The Commission on Peace and Justice –an ad hoc prosecutor for the crimes committed by paramilitary forces- has compiled the declaration of some of the most sanguinary perpetrators that will help to bring justice –and corpses- to the families of thousands of Colombians affected by the war. “El Iguano”, for instance, confessed 2000 executions committed by his unit (El Tiempo, Sep 12, 2007). Although there’s a long way to walk towards the reparations to the families, the Commission’s work is a good –nonetheless temporary- sign of the recovery of the rule of law in Colombia. For horrifying testimonies about the dead squads in Colombia check this link out: http://www.eltiempo.com/multimedia/especiales/justicia/TICKER-WEB-PLANTILLA_TICKER-3525240.html

Correa’s Popularity Dive

A newly released Cedatos-Gallup poll shows President’s Correa’s approval ratings fall to 57%, down from 72% just 2 months ago. Another Cedatos-Gallop poll done in late 2007 shows Ecuadorian’s are rather skeptical on the effect a new constitution will have on the country with 44% believing the country will remain the same after a new constitution is written/implemented, 19% believing it will get worse and 33% thinking it will get better. While Correa has yet to unveil many specific proposals, observer’s note that his declining popularity may serve to soften the nationalist tone of his constitutional reforms in May. On the surface, aims for reform include housing/welfare for the poor, anti-corruption measures, and a tougher stance against Washington’s free-trade initiatives. Beyond the rhetoric, fears are still high that Correa will attempt to diminish congressional powers while concentrating more power within the executive branch.