Argentina: Coming to terms with its Past

Sorry, I must have messed up last week and this didn’t post properly. 

After the return to democracy in 1983, some of the perpetrators of some of those crimes were tried and sentenced. But subsequently the governments of, firstly, Raul Alfonsin and then Carlos Menem pardoned the military leaders responsible for the terror. They talked about moving on, putting the past behind them. But the Argentine people have not done that. A recent campaign in the continued fight for justice is the “escrache” – a popular denunciation of alleged human rights violators. Last week, several thousand people turned up outside the apartment block where the former military leader, Jorge Rafael Videla, lives. They shouted “murderer” and threw red paint at the building. He may never be brought to justice but the protesters are determined that his retirement, at the very least, will not be a comfortable one. In his prologue to the report Nunca Mas, the Argentine writer Ernesto Sabato said: “It is only democracy which can save a people from horror on this scale.” “Only with democracy, will we be certain that Never Again will events such as these, which have made Argentina so sadly infamous throughout the world, be repeated in our nation.” Argentina is still a nation coming to terms with its past. But with each anniversary of the military coming to power, the confidence that it will not return to that nightmare is growing.

Argentina’s Presidential Decree

Argentina’s President recently used her presidential decree powers in two high profile cases. 

First, and to the dismay of many living in Argentina’s west and south, President Kirchner used a decree to temporarily move all clocks forward one hour starting on December 30^th.  This adjustment, which leaves much of the country under daylight well into the night, is hoped to alleviate Argentina’s power shortages and Buenos Aires’ recent blackouts. 

Then, in a move that will bring the first high speed train to Latin America, President Kirchner used a presidential decree to grant a 1.5 billion dollar contract for a high speed train link between Buenos Aires and Cordoba to a consortium headed by the French company Alstom. 

            These two decrees demonstrate the proactive power afforded to Argentina’s President by the country’s institutions, and more generally, highlight the powers of presidential decrees in presidential systems. The result, in these two cases, has been decisive policy making on two issues calling for quick decisions, although it appears both decisions may have some feeling left out.

For more on these two stories, please see:

http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10566820

http://www.hemscott.com/news/latest-news/item.do?newsId=57266947191808

Riding Uribe’s Wave of Popularity

Support for Uribe is at a record high of 80%, but the results from the municipal elections in October 2007 show that uribista parties aren’t faring quite as well. While uribistas won more gubernatorial and mayoral seats than any other party, they lost the mayoral races in key cities including Bogota. Why aren’t the parties as popular as Uribe?

The presidency is built on the personality and patronage of Uribe rather than a party label. As a defector from the Liberal party, Uribe won his first campaign as an independent and later formed “Partido de la U” around himself. The party is weakly institutionalized, as is the larger coalition, which includes five major parties. There is no reason to think that the party or the coalition will prevail without Uribe. The members are willing to ride the wave of his popularity for now. Yet, a dive in the polls could change his support since there is not a unifying ideology for the group. When it comes time to elect the next president, expect several parties in the coalition to offer candidates.

So, what do the people want in their next president? Well, according to El Tiempo, “The one who gives the most guarantees to the country that they will continue the model of Uribe will win the presidency.” But, without a meaningful party label, how will they know who is most like Uribe? Will they just elect anyone that he endorses? Or, will Uribe change the constitution to run again? Without an institutionalized party system, voters will find it harder to form expectations and hold their leaders accountable. The next president may find himself forming a new party and a new coalition all over again.

President Ortega’s Abuse of Power

            One of the main topics for this week is the pros and cons of presidential and parliamentary systems.  Nicaragua has a presidential form of government.  An article in the Nicaraguan newspaper, El Nuevo Diario, highlights a kind of difficulty presidential systems face with addressing executive abuses of power.  More specifically, Hugo Torres and Mónica Baltodano, who are both part of the MRS alliance (an opposition party in Nicaragua) criticize President Ortega and his wife, First Lady Rosario Murillo.  They criticize Murillo’s reasons for why President Ortega’s entire family goes with him on his state trips.  Torres and Baltodano believe Ortega is abusing the law, and they compare the Ortega family to the rich kings of Saudi Arabia and their families.  Their main criticism is that Ortega’s family receives added benefits (like contracts) in conducting business while on trips with President Ortega.  MRS said that President Ortega is abusing his power by satisfying his and his family’s interests, and not necessarily Nicaragua’s.

 

            This situation in Nicaragua highlights the fact that in a presidential system the legislature has limitations in reprimanding the executive for abuses of power.  One of the only ways to remove an executive in a presidential system is through impeachment.  However, impeachment trials are costly both in terms of time and money; so only executives who commit the most serious abuses will be brought to trial.  Since President Ortega’s abuses are relatively minor, there is little the legislature can do to prevent him from carrying out these abuses of power.  In addition to having difficulty in removing an executive, (s)he serves a fixed term.  There is little chance that President Ortega will leave before his term is up in 2012.  Ultimately, not only can the legislature not stop President Ortega from abusing his power, chances are he will continue to do so unchecked until his term is over. 

 

The article can be accessed at: http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/6872#top

-Nicaragua Group

Nicaragua: presidentialismo o parlamentarismo?

The reforms to the Nicaragua’s constitution of 2005 have introduced changes that push Nicaragua toward a Parliamentary system. The actual implementation of all these changes has been frozen by a law, Ley Marco. Since 2005 the legislative body has retained the majority of the power and the head of state had lost its importance although he cannot be removed by the legislature yet. This system is called “parlamentarismo sui generis”.

The constitutional changes are probably going to be implemented now that there is a coincidence of interests between the FSLN and the PLC. Both the leaders, Ortega y Aleman, would benefit from the change. Ortega cannot be reelected as a president but he could become a prime minister and Aleman is still in the middle of a trial and his party’s support is decreasing. Aleman and Ortega want to get rid of the reelection issue.

The member of the legislative assembly Edwin Castro (Sandinista) declared that negotiations with the PLC thinge on the parliamentary option “estamos hablando de un sistema parlamentario, y si a eso le agregás participación ciudadana, se vuelve mucho más rico porque vas eliminando la enorme discrecionalidad que tiene el Ejecutivo. Crear la figura del primer ministro como jefe de gobierno, que puede ser retirado del gobierno si pierde la mayoría parlamentaria. El primer ministro ejercería el cargo mientras tenga mayoría parlamentaria, no tiene período”. (El Nuevo Diario 27/09/07)

The two parties are focusing on the French model of semi-presidentailism. Rafael Solís from the Corte Suprema de Justicia, stated “Creo yo que el (sistema) francés pudiera ser un buen experimento, el Presidente queda con algunas facultades, se elige directamente, pero a la vez el parlamento es el que concentra mayor poder y nombra a un primer ministro” (La Prensa 16/10/10).

 

In another article, the leader of the MUC, Daniel Ortega Reyes, is supporting the reform to the constitutions of 2005, which are still frozen, which would lead to a change toward a parliamentary system.

 

sources: http://impreso.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2007/10/11/politica/61188

souces:http://correosemanal.blogspot.com/2007/11/nicaragua-presidencialismo-o.html

Peru and Ecuador, States of Transition

Both Ecuador and Peru have had a rough transition to democracy. Peru and Ecuador have exhibited low levels of faith in the legislative institutions. This past fall Rafael Correa was elected to office based upon a clean slate platform. He promised to dissolve Congress, where his party abstained from running, and rewrite the constitution to strengthen powers to the executive. Alberto Fujimori instituted his own autogolpe or fujigolpe as it has become known, to strip the legislature and judiciary of their ability to serve as check on his authority. Perhaps more disturbing is the fact that both rogue Presidents carried out these coups with the popular support of the people, at least according to polls taken at the time.

Unfortunately for Mr. Fujomori, the people eventually lost faith in his powers to reform and improve Peru. During his second term in office, critics became increasingly vocal and increasingly effective at highlighting the various “irregularities” originating in Lima. The pinnacle of these irregularities was his refusal to undergo a runoff vote after receiving 48.9% of the popular vote. This was very similar to the type of situation that Hugo Chavez is currently experiencing in Venezuela. Though unlike Chavez, Fujimori chose not respect the institutions that he had created in the 1993 Constitution, and proceeded into a third term in office. After months of popular unrest and continued boycott from the opposition party in the legislature, Fujimori called for a new presidential election in which he would not participate. Rather than facing criminal charges for vote-rigging and various acts carried out by his intelligence chief, Fujimori attempted to resign from office. The legislature refused to accept his resignation and instead chose to boot him from office, citing him as “morally disabled.”

Ecuador has followed in the path of Venezuela in instituting widespread reforms under its new charismatic, populist president. Rafael Correa has even gone as far as saying that he sees a prominent place for “21^st Century Socialism” in the new Ecuador. Correa created novel political institutions to carryout this transformation. The mainstay of this transformative unit is the constitutional assembly, a body appointed by Correa and his supports to craft the new constitution. Interestingly, after the constitutional assembly indicated their desire to call for a congressional “recess” until the new constitution was voted upon, the congressional leadership preempted this action by calling for the recess themselves.

Ecuador’s story seems to conflict with the types of transitions described in the Geddes piece. She highlights the relative impotence of popular will. One may argue that Correa rose through democratic means and therefore is still loyal to his constituency, but to acknowledge his rise to power as a democratic norm would be offensive to both terms. Only time will tell if Correa will be able to give up the authoritarian powers, once this transition period is complete. Otherwise he may look to his neighbor to the north for a vision of his future and Ecuador may get their 16th government in ten years.