President Ortega’s Abuse of Power

            One of the main topics for this week is the pros and cons of presidential and parliamentary systems.  Nicaragua has a presidential form of government.  An article in the Nicaraguan newspaper, El Nuevo Diario, highlights a kind of difficulty presidential systems face with addressing executive abuses of power.  More specifically, Hugo Torres and Mónica Baltodano, who are both part of the MRS alliance (an opposition party in Nicaragua) criticize President Ortega and his wife, First Lady Rosario Murillo.  They criticize Murillo’s reasons for why President Ortega’s entire family goes with him on his state trips.  Torres and Baltodano believe Ortega is abusing the law, and they compare the Ortega family to the rich kings of Saudi Arabia and their families.  Their main criticism is that Ortega’s family receives added benefits (like contracts) in conducting business while on trips with President Ortega.  MRS said that President Ortega is abusing his power by satisfying his and his family’s interests, and not necessarily Nicaragua’s.

 

            This situation in Nicaragua highlights the fact that in a presidential system the legislature has limitations in reprimanding the executive for abuses of power.  One of the only ways to remove an executive in a presidential system is through impeachment.  However, impeachment trials are costly both in terms of time and money; so only executives who commit the most serious abuses will be brought to trial.  Since President Ortega’s abuses are relatively minor, there is little the legislature can do to prevent him from carrying out these abuses of power.  In addition to having difficulty in removing an executive, (s)he serves a fixed term.  There is little chance that President Ortega will leave before his term is up in 2012.  Ultimately, not only can the legislature not stop President Ortega from abusing his power, chances are he will continue to do so unchecked until his term is over. 

 

The article can be accessed at: http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/6872#top

-Nicaragua Group

Nicaragua: presidentialismo o parlamentarismo?

The reforms to the Nicaragua’s constitution of 2005 have introduced changes that push Nicaragua toward a Parliamentary system. The actual implementation of all these changes has been frozen by a law, Ley Marco. Since 2005 the legislative body has retained the majority of the power and the head of state had lost its importance although he cannot be removed by the legislature yet. This system is called “parlamentarismo sui generis”.

The constitutional changes are probably going to be implemented now that there is a coincidence of interests between the FSLN and the PLC. Both the leaders, Ortega y Aleman, would benefit from the change. Ortega cannot be reelected as a president but he could become a prime minister and Aleman is still in the middle of a trial and his party’s support is decreasing. Aleman and Ortega want to get rid of the reelection issue.

The member of the legislative assembly Edwin Castro (Sandinista) declared that negotiations with the PLC thinge on the parliamentary option “estamos hablando de un sistema parlamentario, y si a eso le agregás participación ciudadana, se vuelve mucho más rico porque vas eliminando la enorme discrecionalidad que tiene el Ejecutivo. Crear la figura del primer ministro como jefe de gobierno, que puede ser retirado del gobierno si pierde la mayoría parlamentaria. El primer ministro ejercería el cargo mientras tenga mayoría parlamentaria, no tiene período”. (El Nuevo Diario 27/09/07)

The two parties are focusing on the French model of semi-presidentailism. Rafael Solís from the Corte Suprema de Justicia, stated “Creo yo que el (sistema) francés pudiera ser un buen experimento, el Presidente queda con algunas facultades, se elige directamente, pero a la vez el parlamento es el que concentra mayor poder y nombra a un primer ministro” (La Prensa 16/10/10).

 

In another article, the leader of the MUC, Daniel Ortega Reyes, is supporting the reform to the constitutions of 2005, which are still frozen, which would lead to a change toward a parliamentary system.

 

sources: http://impreso.elnuevodiario.com.ni/2007/10/11/politica/61188

souces:http://correosemanal.blogspot.com/2007/11/nicaragua-presidencialismo-o.html

Peru and Ecuador, States of Transition

Both Ecuador and Peru have had a rough transition to democracy. Peru and Ecuador have exhibited low levels of faith in the legislative institutions. This past fall Rafael Correa was elected to office based upon a clean slate platform. He promised to dissolve Congress, where his party abstained from running, and rewrite the constitution to strengthen powers to the executive. Alberto Fujimori instituted his own autogolpe or fujigolpe as it has become known, to strip the legislature and judiciary of their ability to serve as check on his authority. Perhaps more disturbing is the fact that both rogue Presidents carried out these coups with the popular support of the people, at least according to polls taken at the time.

Unfortunately for Mr. Fujomori, the people eventually lost faith in his powers to reform and improve Peru. During his second term in office, critics became increasingly vocal and increasingly effective at highlighting the various “irregularities” originating in Lima. The pinnacle of these irregularities was his refusal to undergo a runoff vote after receiving 48.9% of the popular vote. This was very similar to the type of situation that Hugo Chavez is currently experiencing in Venezuela. Though unlike Chavez, Fujimori chose not respect the institutions that he had created in the 1993 Constitution, and proceeded into a third term in office. After months of popular unrest and continued boycott from the opposition party in the legislature, Fujimori called for a new presidential election in which he would not participate. Rather than facing criminal charges for vote-rigging and various acts carried out by his intelligence chief, Fujimori attempted to resign from office. The legislature refused to accept his resignation and instead chose to boot him from office, citing him as “morally disabled.”

Ecuador has followed in the path of Venezuela in instituting widespread reforms under its new charismatic, populist president. Rafael Correa has even gone as far as saying that he sees a prominent place for “21^st Century Socialism” in the new Ecuador. Correa created novel political institutions to carryout this transformation. The mainstay of this transformative unit is the constitutional assembly, a body appointed by Correa and his supports to craft the new constitution. Interestingly, after the constitutional assembly indicated their desire to call for a congressional “recess” until the new constitution was voted upon, the congressional leadership preempted this action by calling for the recess themselves.

Ecuador’s story seems to conflict with the types of transitions described in the Geddes piece. She highlights the relative impotence of popular will. One may argue that Correa rose through democratic means and therefore is still loyal to his constituency, but to acknowledge his rise to power as a democratic norm would be offensive to both terms. Only time will tell if Correa will be able to give up the authoritarian powers, once this transition period is complete. Otherwise he may look to his neighbor to the north for a vision of his future and Ecuador may get their 16th government in ten years.

Block against the dictatorship group in Nicaragua

This past Saturday, “El Nuevo Diario,” a Nicaraguan newspaper published an interview with Victor Hugo Tinoco, a delegate from the party MRS. In the interview, Tinoco discussed a group called “Bloque contra la dictadura” or Block against the dictatorship. This group is made up of politicians who believe that President Ortega has dictatorship tendencies. They say that Ortega does not have a military dictatorship but that they are concerned in how President Ortega is restricting people’s liberties. More specifically, they describe Ortega as having an “institutional democracy.” In response, they are promoting democracy and personal freedoms within Nicaragua. One of their biggest complaints of Ortega’s actions consist of Ortega not being forthcoming about what he does with the money earned from selling Venezuelan oil.

We thought this article related to Wednesday’s readings on dictatorships and transitions to democracies.

The article can be accessed in full at: http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/politica/6290

-Nicaragua Group

Dynamics of Military Pay Negotiation in Brazil

Wendy Hunter (Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthoritarianism Brazil, 2001) sought to explain why the Brazilian military has declined in strength since transition to democracy. Institionalists had predicted otherwise given the military’s rule during the most recent democratic transition which should have allowed them to structure the system in ways that solidified their control. She focuses on the particularistic and programmatic incentives of Brazilian politicians to explain the logic of their efforts to weaken military power since democratization.

Programmaticly, she details the efforts of military to resist labor rights and particularly the right to strike. The military sees this as antithetical to its preference for social order and discipline, it associates labor movements with revolutionary leftists, and it sees redistributitive labor policies as impeding growth and consequently , Brazil’s assent to “major industrial power” status. Politicians on the other hand have been electorally rewarded for policies that promote social equity by Brazil’s working class majority and so have successfully countered military efforts to outlaw/restrict labor strikes.

Particularistic incentives reward politicians for directing resources to their constituencies. In their desire for re-election, politicians therefore fight to shift budgetary resources from the military towards ministries that better lend themselves to pork barrel spending and clientalistic transfers. Hunter points to a decline in the military’s share of the budget from 1985 to 1992 in all but one year as evidence of this phenomenon. She also explains that politicians have a related incentive to further weaken the military’s institutional power by removing military officials from government posts so they may doll out the vacant positions to reward political patronage.

Fast-forward to 2008 and we see an interesting development. The military is threatening a strike, complaining that they are under-paid and that Lula and PT (Workers’ Party) have broken promises to increase soldiers compensation packages. The military is legally prohibited from striking, and has never done so in Brazil.In the same breath, the military (via the National Union of Armed Forces Spouses or ‘UNEFMA’) is also threatening electoral consequences for PT if an adequate salary agreement is not reached. “UNEMFA’s objective now is to weaken the president’s party until it no longer exists. We will begin a campaign where service members transfer their voter registration to municipalities where they will overwhelm the district and stop voting for PT candidates in municipal elections,” UNEFMAs President said.

Although a first-ever military strike seems to conform to the middle ground Chalmers describes as neither “orderly bargaining nor violent confrontation”, it does not plausibly threaten political stability and therefore does not represent politicization. In fact, the military’s enthusiasm for threatening electoral costs and a strike (a common tool of organized labor in a liberal democracy) can be interpreted as a sign of healthy institutionalization. Taken in light of the fact that the state was ruled by military dictators some two decades ago, the Brazilian democracy seems to be on sure footing.

Further, the strike threat is an ironic twist in the context in the historical context Hunter (2001) describes (as summarized above). Angered by low pay (consistent with the trend of reduced budget allocations to the military) soldiers feel the need to resort to a technique their elite ranks fought hard to outlaw.

Finally, we can see just how safe Lula feels from a coup or other direct military interference. If he considered the military a threat to his power he would probably have placated the armed services with a pay raise already.

-The Brazil Group

(Eric Engelman, Antonio Gonzalez, Preston Sharp, Tiffany June)

The vibrancy of democracy in Venezuela under Chavez

The debate over Hugo Chavez’s commitment to democracy has been well-documented over his tenure as president. This link is to an interesting commentary in the Washington Times from 1999 on the future of Chavez’s presidency, which predicted that he would establish a radical military dictatorship and help radicals take power in other Latin American countries while leading Venezuelans down a path of repression and poverty similar to what has been experienced by Cubans over the last four decades. The author suggested that Chavez’s leadership would undo Venezuela’s transition to democracy. Around the same time, in an address to the nation, Chavez insisted that the rule of law would not be undermined and Venezuela was on the road to democracy. In his speech, Chavez declared, “There is no authoritarian process under way in Venezuela to give absolute power to a single person. In Venezuela, we are not destroying institutions, they were destroyed a long time ago. In Venezuela, most of us are involved in an immense democratic, peaceful, broad and respectful effort to rebuild the institutions, to lay the groundwork for a true democratic republic, to lay the groundwork for a truly free, sovereign and independent country in line with the demands of the 21^st century, a century that is beginning to appear on the horizon.”

Clearly, the situation in Venezuela has not diminished to the level predicted and many are citing the failure of Chavez’s December 2^nd referendum as an indicator of the vibrancy of the democratic process. Recently, 55 members of Britain’s Parliament from five different parties backed a motion that stated that Chavez’s acceptance of the result “once again show how absurd the claims are that Venezuela under Chavez is not a democracy.” This leads to the questions: Is Chavez truly committed to democracy in Venezuela? Is Venezuela a vibrant democracy as the MPs assert or has Chavez’s leadership taken the democratic process in Venezuela backward? Was Chavez’s close defeat in the Constitutional referendum a sign of Venezuela’s commitment to democracy?

Labor unions strategize in the democratization of Brazil?

Labor unions strategize in the democratization of Brazil?

Geddes claims that “most observers of Latin American transitions assign little importance to popular mobilization as a cause of democratization. Popular mobilizations took place in many countries, but they usualy occurred late in the process, when democratization was well underway and the risks of opposition had diminished.” This was true in the case of Brazil as well, demonstrated by a jump from two strikes in 1983 to 42 strikes in 1987. These took place during the peak of democratization when there was less threat of opposition from the military regime and gave strategic labor unions an opportunity to capitalize on the transition to democracy, strengthening future worker’s rights.

Payne (1991) describes the labor unions of Brazil as a “democratic recalcitrant” (motivated by a desire to participate) group, as portrayed by O’Donnell and Shmitter, instead of “maximalist members” (motivated by self-interest) or “opportunistic elements” (motivated by a fear of a coup) groups. This is evident as the labor unions confronted the transitional government and demanded mutually acceptable rules and democratic procedures while insisting that they have the right to participate in the formation of these procedures. They were able to do this as Luis Inacio da Silva (Lula), the president of the Workers Party, was elected to the constituent’s assembly which helped create the new constitution. Beyond Lula, they lacked strong representation in the assembly but lobbied vigorously, drafted an extensive labor legislation proposal (of which many aspects were incorporated into the constitution), and leveraged trade unions, political parties, and lobbyists to work in their favor.

The main idea from Payne’s article (www.jstor.org/view/00104159/ap020092/02a00060/0) was that the labor unions in Brazil were able to participate in the creation of the new constitution because of the economic, political, and organizational environment of the time. But, that they were also able to be influential because of the route they took, acting as a “democratic recalcitrant” organization (prioritizing change but demanding the right to participate) rather than as “maximalist members” (prioritizing self-interest and rioting or using violence) or “opportunistic elements” (motivated by fear of a coup and being acquiescent). This brings about the question, which of these had a greater impact on labor unions ability to have an influence in the political process that created the new constitution? Was it because of the environment of the time or the manner in which labor unions represented themselves? Payne argues that the former may be more accurate and that the “strength of the movement, whether during a political transition or a stable democracy, does not depend on the strategy chosen by the labor movement, but rather on the political, economic, and organizational constraints on it.”

Payne also argues that even though democratization increased freedoms for labor unionists, their ability to act collectively was constrained in three ways.

1) Governments continued control over the working class and employers protection from wage demands

2) The economic crisis prevented many from participating in labor strikes and weakened their public movements

3) The blossoming of new labor unions resulted in pluralism and the representation of many different interests and a lack of unity.

I’m curious to know everyone else’s opinion here… Do you agree with Geddes and Payne that the constraints of the political, economic, and organizational environment limit the strength of a movement? Or can these constraints be faced and overcome without compromising the movement’s agenda?

Brazil Group

Sugar and Clients in Guatemala

The following was taken from the UN Human Development Report written by  Roman Krznaric in 2005.  It documents the power of landed sugar elites in rural Guatemala.  I think this is relevant to our study of Clientelism because it shows that the colonial roots of the modern system are still functioning today.  Krznaric goes on to show that sugar elites actually loan money directly to municipal governments. 

Several factors have helped the sugar barons grow as a political force:

• United in the Guatemalan Sugar Association (ASAZGUA), the elite sugar growing and milling families have become increasingly influential within CACIF during the past decade and have repeatedly held the presidency of the organisation.

• The Guatemalan state has become ever more dependent on the sugar sector as a source of foreign exchange earnings and employment.

• Two of the three Presidents since the end of the civil war (Arzú and Berger) have been members of the economic elite sympathetic to CACIF and the sugar elite, and have appointed business association leaders to cabinet positions.

Krznaric, Roman: The Limits on Pro-Poor Agricultural Trade in Guatemala: Land, Labour and Political Power October 2004 UNDP.

Chile’s Return to Democracy

Following 17 years of authoritarian rule by General Augusto Pinochet, Chile finally returned to civilian rule in 1990.  Contrary to popular theory that political transition usually occurs during economic downturns, in Chile it was the political will of the people which tipped the balance of power, but not in reaction to any economic woes of the time. 

The article linked below was published by Foreign Affairs magazine just after the dictator was voted out of office, and describes Chile’s transition to democratic rule as being “remarkably smooth.”  Much to his surprise, the people voted against another decade of the dictator’s rule in a referendum held in October 1988.  A stunning ninety percent of eligible voters turned out for the referendum that ended Pinochet’s reign by 55 to 43.  Rather than keeping power through force, Pinochet conceded defeat, opening Chile to new democratic presidential elections.

Why this relatively smooth and peaceful transition? The authors give credit to two primary factors: the first is Chile’s “deeply rooted democratic and law-abiding political culture,” and the second is that Chile’s armed forces “remained highly disciplined, professional and uncorrupted.”  The armed forces were sworn to uphold the transition formula written under their own 1980 constitution, and chose not to try and retain control when their commander in chief had been voted out.  It shows a certain commitment by the Chileans (and its army) to institutionalized rules and democratic principles, and Pinochet had to realize that he had lost his ‘supermajority’ he needed to keep grip on the country. 

Also interesting is that by both peacefully conceding power, and not leaving citizens angered by any economic disarray, Pinochet was able to negotiate favorable post-transitional outcomes for himself (Geddes).  Pinochet retained the powerful position as Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army until 1997 and was made senator for life.  The dictator was also able to protect himself from prosecution for the grave human rights abuses that occurred under his rule. 

posted by Chilean Group

 Article link: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19891201faessay5992/pamela-constable-arturo-valenzuela/chile-s-return-to-democracy.html 

For full PDF version of article visit: http://pao.chadwyck.com/articles/search.do?reset=yes and enter article and journal name. 

Source: “Chile’s Return to Democracy”, Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela (Foreign Affairs, Winter 1989/90)

Colombia’s eroded democracy: how much of a change?

Colombia –together with Venezuela and Costa Rica- was a vibrant democracy at the time the rest of Latin America lived under different forms authoritarianism. Despite the exclusionary character of its constitution (Mainwaring et. al. 2005, 44), the country managed to preserve the minimal electoral requisites of a democracy until the FARC, the ELN and other death squads decided to ignore the institutions and took power with violent means. Two events, however, might change our perception of how Colombia is asserting its democratic roots in a context of violence:

 

1)    32 governors and 1099 majors will take office with a huge pressure over their shoulders: as of 2008, local congresses and municipal councils can impeach all heads of government and their closer collaborators. The reform’s aim is to make politicians more accountable to the people and have an instrument to penalize them in cases of maladministration. President Uribe announced a counter-reform to eliminate this prerogative that, according to him, “can be used by capricious politicians every time they feel uncomfortable with the major or governor in turn”. The Congress –of course- announced it would resist the proposed change. (Cambio, Jan 9, 2008). This is an interesting –nonetheless insufficient- step to recover democratic spaces for the citizens of Colombia.

2) The Commission on Peace and Justice –an ad hoc prosecutor for the crimes committed by paramilitary forces- has compiled the declaration of some of the most sanguinary perpetrators that will help to bring justice –and corpses- to the families of thousands of Colombians affected by the war. “El Iguano”, for instance, confessed 2000 executions committed by his unit (El Tiempo, Sep 12, 2007). Although there’s a long way to walk towards the reparations to the families, the Commission’s work is a good –nonetheless temporary- sign of the recovery of the rule of law in Colombia. For horrifying testimonies about the dead squads in Colombia check this link out: http://www.eltiempo.com/multimedia/especiales/justicia/TICKER-WEB-PLANTILLA_TICKER-3525240.html