Brazil’s battle with Gang Violence and Police Corruption

Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo boast murder rates of 40 and 18 per 100,000 citizens, respectively.  Sao Paulo’s rate has dropped from 35 per 100,000 citizens in 1999. 

The gangs in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo have real power.  In September of 2002, Rio de Janeiro suffered “Black Monday” when schools, stores, offices, markets, and transportation shut down to gang influence.  In Sao Paulo, the Primerio Comando da Capital (PCC) staged a multi-prison rebellion in 2001 and orchestrated a five-day wave of violence in May of 2006.  Within the state, 150 people were murdered, 82 buses were burned, and 17 bank branches were attacked as more than half of the 140 prisons erupted with rebellions.  All organized by mobile phones from prison cells.

The ongoing struggle between the government, police, and Sao Paulo’s main criminal gang (Primeiro Comando da Capital) has and will continue to disrupt public safety.    The P.C.C. may control 140,000 prisoners in Sao Paulo alone with another 500,000 supporters outside the prison system.  These members produce millions of dollars in monthly fees for the P.C.C. and helped coordinate the chaos in May 2006.  The state’s attempt to dissipate the gang’s strength by separating members and imprisoning them in other states has led to a strengthening of the organization nationally.

Sao Paulo implemented reform in 1990 that mandated jail time for selling drugs and has resulted in overcrowded prisons with 35% more prisoners than space.   With such high concentrations of drug dealers, the prisons have become gang centers that breed increased levels of violence and insecurity.  State officials often fight back with a heavy hand.  Sao Paulo’s May 2006 incident resulted in the death of 100 “suspects.” 

Brazil’s pardoning labor code protects the jobs of many public servants.  Job security and low salaries complement corruption as police are easily enticed by bribes with little fear of losing their job and few incentives to remain clean.  State officials have attempted to infiltrate the corrupt police force but only to have them reinstated by court order. 

- The Brazil Group

http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_GJPJGSG

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B04E5DD103DF933A15753C1A9649C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1

http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=6950391

http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9597408

http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7922722

http://pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=495&language_id=1

Panama, Trade, and Private Interests

A recent article in the Tico Times, a Central American English language newspaper, reported on Panama’s propensity for free trade agreements, the most recent with Guatemala (http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive/2008_02/0227083.htm). The recent referendum in Costa Rica regarding it’s participation in CAFTA and Panama’s referendum about canal extension indicate the politically charged nature of trade oriented decisions in the region. Although these governments have taken the less risky route of letting the public decide on these two issues, Panamanian multiple free trade agreements have been made by the government independently. This leads us to question the influence of interest groups outside the government in influencing, or failing to influence, these neoliberal policy measures.

Panama has a unique position as a country who’s history is tied to its political and economic function as a nation that services the interests of other nations, most recently characterized by relations particular to the Panama Canal, the Colon Free Trade Zone, and the off-shore banking industry*.  Because of this scenario, it is fair to assume that Panama’s most powerful interest groups, like those in most countries, represent private enterprise in these sectors.

This marginalizes labor and environmental lobbies and the U.S. State Department’s 2005 Human Rights report questioned the extent of worker rights in Panama, particularly in export processing zones (EPZ’s).  For example, unions are not granted the right to strike in EPZ’s and Panama’s laws regulating the zones don’t include arbitration or labor dispute settlement guidelines.  Furthermore, the report noted that child labor is a problem in the country. This leads us to believe that neoliberal economic policy in Panama is developed out of private industry partnerships with politicians with little input from labor representation or other interest groups.

*Dougherty, Mary. A Study in Civil Society, Scales of Influence, and Corruption in Panama.  University of Pennsylvania, 2002.

Leader Moves To Dominate Civic Groups In Venezuela

This article from September 2000 shows Hugo Chavez’s attempt at using informal means to ensure his power and control over the government. The article explains that to begin his plan, Chavez wanted first to get rid of the largest labor union in Venezuela, the Venezuelan Worker’s Confederation (CTV) in order to start moving labor unions under the control of his “revolutionary” movement.

In the same article Venezuelan civic groups (human rights associations, religious groups and civic groups) are addressed. Chavez decided that these groups would not have a part in “participatory democracy” or in designating Supreme Court nominees anymore.

In consolidating labor unions under one “government dominated union” and not allowing civil groups to have any influence in decision-making, Chavez is constraining politics outside of formal institutions and is therefore able to hold on to and seize more power over the government.

 

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DE1DD1E39F933A2575AC0A9669C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all

 - Venezuela Group

 

 

 

Role of Concertación in implementation of Washingotn Consensus in Brazil and Mexico

Ben Schneider’s article (Confidence and Concertation in Brazil and Mexico, 1997) attempts to explain why Brazil and Mexico, both pursuing similar ISI development strategies at the beginning of the 1980’s, took different approaches to neoliberal economic reform, with Mexico enacting deep and rapid reforms and Brazil taking a slow and less drastic approach. 

While he attributes the depth of reform to the severity of the economic crises that preceded them, Schneider seeks to explain the pacing and success of stabilization and liberalization policies, arguing that this depended heavily on the nature of government business relations.

In government-business relations, he downplays the importance of high-level officials relationships with business leaders and the process of policy hold-up by business interests earning rent from the status quo.  He also faults institutionalist explanations for failing to explain the timing of reforms.  Instead, he asserts the importance of concertación (or in Brazil pacto social) a process of regular meetings between representatives of business associations, the government and sometimes labor unions to negotiate the details of policy implementation.  He argues that neoliberal reforms  (such as policies to combat hyper-inflation)  must be both credible and flexible to succeed but that flexibility undermines credibility.  Concertación is one of the few ways to enhance both.

He points to high levels of concertación in Mexico as having reduced the costs of reform and led to more rapid stabilization than in Brazil where concertación was weak and restructuring programs where “stabilization came and the implementation of structural reforms such as trade liberalization was slow and uneven”. 

So one is apt to ask, why was concertación weak and not fomalized in Brazil as it was in Mexico?  Schneider argues that the difference was political stability, strong business associations, and shared perceptions of vulnerability.  Brazil was a fledgling democracy with many parties attempting to lead the country in different directions, while Mexico was firmly under PRI control.  With respect to business associations, Mexico had a formal peak organization (the Consejo Coordenador Empresarial or CCE) representing sectoral associations, so that officials could effectively communicate with business as a whole.  Brazil lacked such a business umbrella organization.   

Although he successfully motivates the role that Concertación plays in the policy making and implementation process, he fails to meaningfully explain why concertación differed in Mexico and Brazil, without relying on the very explanations for reform that he bgins the article by downplaying.  The first difference that he argues led to differences in concertación was “political stability”.  Its hard to see how this departs from institutionalist arguments.  If political stability is not driven by institutions  and exogenous shocks, then where does this variation on “political stability”come from?  Secondly, the existence of peak associations in business as a “cause” of differences in concertacíon seems plausible but is of little value without going deeper.  What caused business in Mexico to organize in representing its preferences to government while business in Brazil did not?  Again, it would be hard to answer this without making institutional arguments or relying on the incentives of rent-seeking coalitions to apply pressure through political means.  Schneiders third difference contributing to variance in concertación, “shared perceptions of vulnerability” is not really developed. 

The argument is interesting and the article offers good insight into business government relations, the processes by which business preferences are organized and represented to government, and he drivers of successful stabilization programs.  But the conclusions offered overreach or leave important questions like why Brazil lacked a peak business organization or formalized concertación procedures unexplained.   It would be fascinating to find a source of difference between Brazil and Mexico separate from institutional factors or rent-seeking behavior that led to differential neoliberal reforms.  But concertación does not seem to meet this criteria.   It appears to be essentially the result of both of these.

Ecuador’s (proposed) 20th Constitution

Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa took office in 2006, vowing to write a new constitution. If a new constitution were to be ratified, it would be the 20^th time the country has adopted a new constitution since its independence in 1830. Constitutional change is commonplace – in fact, former President José María Velasco Ibarra went so far as to completely abolish the constitutions of 1935, 1946, and 1970, claiming that they “limited the general will of the people.” While President Correa has not made identical claims, he does appear to be echoing Velasco Ibarra’s populist rhetoric in regards to the new constitution.

 

One example of Correa’s populist underpinnings is his claim that the Constitutional Assembly currently drafting the new constitution will “wrest power” from the “corrupt elite.” Populism in Ecuador has been characterized by a significant “demonization” of the opposition, whether they are specific political rivals or “the oligarchy” in general. In proposing yet another constitution, Correa claims to be bettering the situation of “the people,” whose concerns and interests he allegedly to embodies.

 

However, it appears that “the people” have some significant doubts as to whether Correa is actually representing them. In April 2006, when citizens voted on the referendum to create a Constitutional Assembly, the proposal for a new constitution was supported by 82% of all voters. By November 30, approval ratings for the new constitution had fallen to 62%, and continued to fall through the new year. Current polls show that only 38% of individuals favor the writing of a new assembly by the Constitutional Assembly.  

 

This decrease in support from “the people” may be due to the lack of actual representation present in the creation of the new constitution. In the 2006 election, no representatives from President Correa’s party won seats in the (now disbanded) legislature. However, on the September 30 election for the 130 assembly members, Correa’s supporters won 80 seats, and 69% of the vote. With more than a simple majority holding power in the Assembly, Correa has little interest or incentive to cooperate or reach a consensus with opponents.

 

Still, the referendum to ratify the new constitution must be held in a nation-wide vote, and the decreasing approval ratings seem to foreshadow a similar fate for Correa’s constitution as that experienced by Chavez’s recently failed referendum. In order to enact significant, representative change, Correa must drop his populist rhetoric, and embrace the necessity of dialogue and compromise with the opposition. Otherwise he may be the 9^th president in the past 11 years to fail to complete a full four-year term.

Quarrelsome Chileans acting out

In the last couple years, two major issues have persisted in Chile: inequality and windfall copper profit – which is Chile’s main export. Inequality is a contentious issue that continually generates criticism today of Chile’s problems in everything from labor standards to education. The effect of inequality has found its way into politics outside of elected institutions (as can be seen in the articles below). Additionally, the price of copper, of which Chile is the world’s greatest supplier, has reached historically high levels. This seemingly unforeseen government revenue has been generally beneficial to the country; nevertheless, citizenry’s demand for action against inequality has only grown more vocal in the face of this financial accumulation. Although Chile’s unions and other non-elected actors are not as strong as in other Latin American countries, such as Mexico’s teachers union, comfort in confronting the government and the incentives to demand certain responses are correspondingly increasing.

“A worrying precedent“

“Chile labor union protest draws nationwide support“

“Schools out“

Organized Interests in Nicaragua

Monday’s readings deal with how interest groups like Argentine unions are able to organize themselves and bring about change.  Likewise, Venezeuela’s commission system allows those who were not elected to office to have a voice in governmental policy.  While these readings show how people who are not elected into office have the power to change the system, the situation in Nicaragua is quite different.  Groups have not had success in organizing to get their preferences heard by the government.           

 More specifically, in Revista Envío (a publication based in Managua), Sofía Montenegro discusses the lack of organization among interest groups in Nicaraguan society.  First and foremost, she discusses the rise of actors during the 1990s like women, indigenous people, young people, human rights activists and others.  However, at the same time, Nicaragua has very few special interest groups whose purpose is get policy that benefits them.  Groups, like the Catholic Church, prefer no change at all in society, and Nicaraguan unions are hardly in existence anymore.  Additionally, youth and student groups face major organizational problems and peasant groups are consumed by other issues.  At the end of her article, Montenegro discusses the need for change.  She wants women and young people (who constitute a significant portion of the population) to organize and make sure their interests are heard by the government. 

Although this article was written in 2002, Montenegro still highlights that the Nicaraguan people do face significant obstacles in organizing themselves.  However, only through successful organization can these groups bring about policies that favor their interests.  However, from Montenegro’s article, it is quite clear the Nicaraguan people have not experienced success in this area.

Current Issues in Argentina’s State-Union Relationship

In an update on Argentina’s union politics and state-union relations, this month Argentine unions have moved to ignore a government sponsored 20%, two-year wage hike proposal as they enter into salary negotiations whose purpose is to establish labor group wage increases that offset Argentine inflation.

President Kirchner has promised to extend economic growth by encouraging consumer spending while at the same time avoiding salaries that may lead to higher prices, and has established a 20% wage increase level to counter what Argentina’s government claims  was 10%  full year inflation for 2007.

But disputes between Argentina’s government and many unions have arisen as a dozen union groups, representing 70% of Argentina’s workers, are pushing for a larger, 30% one year wage increase in response to what they, and many independent analysts, view as the Argentine government’s downward manipulation of its monthly consumer price index reports and underreporting of inflation.  These groups claim that Argentina’s inflation is really at around 20%, not 10%. 

This has led many experts to predict tough three way negations between the government, employers, and unions in the upcoming months.  The outcome of these negotiations, and the size of the wage increases that Argentina’s unions are able to extract, will be telling signals as to how much the state-union relationship has evolved since the 1990’s when President Menem revised the state-union corporatist relationship through economic reform.

Mexico’s Powerful Unions

In the Crisp reading, Venezuelan interest groups are more than just pressure groups, but rather, have formal access to policy making. Similar to Venezuela, Mexico is a state dominated by union power.  In 2006, about 85% of Mexico’s organized workers were union members. During the PRI era, a network of unions headed by PRI loyalists promised to deliver votes in exchange for relatively good benefits.  Even with President Fox’s arrival in 2000 that ended 71 years of PRI dominance, unions have been able to make increasing demands.  During his term, Fox largely gave into union concessions.  Stories of violent strikes among teachers unions in Oaxaca burning buses and steel plant workers battling with police are not uncommon in Mexico.

 

The transition to democracy has been difficult for many unions preferring the status quo.  Most unions will not disclose financial information and will not allow secret ballot elections.  Even resistance from individual union members is highly discouraged.  This has supported the rich lifestyles of powerful union bosses.

 

The unions are only becoming more powerful now than ever and can be a strong threat to President Calderón’s agenda.  Since he received support from some official labor unions during his campaign, it would be risky for him to challenge them.  As well, independent unions have shown hostility to the PRD in the past.

 

It will be interesting to see how Calderón approach the unions during his term.  He will have to deal with the strong teacher’s union for example.  The Oaxaca teacher’s union is known for going on strike every spring since 1981 and has always gone away with an additional raise.  In addition, oil workers at Pemex received an average of 10% pay increase for six years during Fox’s term, which were about double the rate of inflation.  While Fox have mainly played a passive role with the unions, Calderón may have to take a stronger approach if he is to implement significant changes to the current system.  Only time will tell.

 

For more information:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115993075786482136.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

Argentina – Another wig falls

The removal of a fifth Supreme Court judge threatens the separation of powers:

SHORTLY after assuming Argentina’s presidency, Carlos Menem pushed through one of the brashest court-packing moves in recent memory. In a brief session in April 1990, his Congress added four more seats to the five-member Supreme Court.  Since Néstor Kirchner became president two years ago, he has dedicated himself to ridding the government of Mr Menem’s taint, particularly in the judiciary. Three justices from the bloc have resigned, while a fourth was forcibly discharged in December 2003. The Senate finally removed its last, Antonio Boggiano, from the court on September 28th after finding him guilty of arbitrary, biased and inconsistent rulings.

Along with the recent voluntary retirement of another justice, Mr Boggiano’s departure has created two more vacancies on the court in addition to the four that Mr Kirchner has already filled. Although the president has won widespread praise for making the nomination process more transparent and selecting eminent and independent judges, the possibility of his naming two-thirds of the country’s highest court hardly bodes well for the separation of powers.