Presidential Power in Peru = Squash the Opposition?

Recently, ex-president Alejandro Toledo (of the Perú Posible party) has accused President Alan García (of APRA) of using his executive powers to “harass” members of the opposition, specifically those who are considering running in the 2011 presidential election.

Toledo has recently returned to Peru to work on strengthening his Perú Posible party. In the last elections, the party only won 2 seats (with 4.10% of the total votes) in the 120-seat unicameral Congress. When last in Lima, Toledo was implicated in a case of governmental mismanagement, specifically in regards to improper use of the presidential plane. Humala Tasso, who was a presidential candidate in 2006 with the Unión por el Perú, is also being charged with corruption (the DA has requested that he be sentenced to 15 years in prison). Both men claim to be victims of presidential harassment.

Peru does have a relatively strong executive. Under the most recent constitution, the President appoints the Prime Minister and also the Council of Ministers (the cabinet). Bills can be proposed by either the executive or the legislature, but the president does have reactive (veto) powers. The president also has proactive (decree) powers, but all presidential bill proposals or decrees must first be approved by the Council of Ministers. (But because the Council is nominally appointed by the president, this does not appear to be a huge block to presidential power.)

According to Toledo’s claims, it could be interpreted that García is attempting to further solidify his personal power as president in anticipation of the upcoming presidential elections. In 2006, García received 30.62% of the votes in the first-round election in April, and then won the contest over Tasso with 52.63% of the votes in June. However, as the judiciary is independent of the executive office, it isn’t certain that the cases brought against Toledo and Tasso are examples of a powerful executive oppressing the opposition.

Nicaraguan Congress will not allow President to join with Chavez in military alliance against the United States

On January 28th, Chavez called on Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua to support a proposed military alliance against the U.S. due to its increased presence in Colombia, which he purports threatens their regimes. Despite Ortega’s wishes to join, Nicaragua’s Congressional leader, Edwin Castro, “ruled out the possibility of the Nicaraguan army fighting with Venezuela against the U.S. [because the] country’s constitution makes the military a purely defensive agency.” Despite Ortega’s obstensibly leftist alliance desires, it appears the legislative branch will protect the constitution and their rights under it.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=a53UrWdYLRz8

Carter Helps Monitor Nicaragua Presidential Election

Former President Carter and the Carter Center were in Nicaragua on election day in November 2006 along with international groups like the IPADE, OAS, and EU to monitor the elections. This is the third election the Carter center has participated in Nicaragua and the 67th in the world. According to Mr. Carter, Nicaragua has made significant process since the 1990 election, the first the Carter center participated in overseeing. The previously severe tensions between Ortega’s Sandinistias and oppostion parties as well as problems with the central election commission have been mostly corrected. The Carter Center has continued its oversight and involvement here due to past concern about the Sandinistias.

Brief excerpts from Mr. Carter’s comments:

“Not only do they have a very competent election commission that has, so far, proven to be fairly well balanced, not 100 percent, but there are thousands of international observers here and more than 10,000 domestic observers …”

“…the final tabulation is observed [very] closely, and both the officials representing free parties and the observers have to sign the tabulation sheet. So if there is a subsequent question, then the tabulation sheet has been certified by everyone observing. So it’s a much more careful and meticulous process and much more uniform throughout the country than anything we’ve ever seen in the United States.”

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6439233

Electoral Rules

Presidential System:

 The president is elected for a four-year term with the possibility of one sucessive term.
If none of the candidates receives 45% or more of the votes in the first round of voting, a second round is held.

 Legislative system:

 Bicameral Congress. The 257 deputies are elected for four-year terms and may be re-elected. Half of the Chamber of Deputies is renewed every two years. The 48 senators are elected a ccording to procedure established in local provincial constitutions. One third of the Senate is renewed every two years.

Governors and Municipalities:

Governors and local authorities are elected according to the 25 provincial constitutions.

General Election Information:

 In December of 1983, Argentina returned to a democracy and since then has had free and fair democratic elections. In April 1994, elections were held to form a Constituent Assembly. The Assembly modified the 1953 Constitution with several reforms, including reduction of the president’s term — from six to four years, with the possibility of of a second term — and the adoption of a second round of voting if no candidate receives a majority in the first round. In addition, the reforms abolished the electoral college system.

 

Argentina has a presidential form of government and a bicameral legislature. It is a federal republic consisting of 23 provinces and a semi-autonomous federal capital. Provincial governments are extremely important political entities. They possess their own constitutions, control very large budgets, and exercise influence over vital areas of public policy.

The Chamber of Deputies has 257 members, elected from province-wide multi member districts for four year terms. The deputies are chosen from closed party lists using proportional representation. One half of the Chamber is renewed every two years, with every district renewing one-half its legislators.

The political parties employ three methods of candidate selection: elite arrangement, assembly election, and direct primary. Regardless of which method is used, the province-level party leaders are the key players in the nomination process, with the national party leadership and rank-and file members playing a decidedly secondary role.

Within this institutional context, legislators have little incentive to work hard to improve their visibility in the eyes of the voters and no incentive to develop legislative policy expertise. The institutional barriers to reelection, therefore, generate widespread “shirking”.

Because of the existence of closed party lists and the ability of congressional party leaders to distribute a wide range of material and political resources in the legislature, parties in Argentina are highly disciplined.