Executive-Legislative relations in Colombia

 According to Cox  (et al. 2001), legislators’ responsiveness to presidents depends, primarily, on the limitations to career development (whether or not legislators can be reelected) and secondly, on partisan ideology (the more distant from the president’s ideology, the more reactive legislators tend to be). This might be true for Colombia where legislators can be re-elected and thus, have an incentive to block the President’s proposals if that translates into political capital for the next electoral race. Not surprisingly, the Colombian president utilizes his decree-power very often. Executive-Legislative relations in Colombia are, therefore, quite tense.

 

However, the most recent law on forestal resources  not only demonstrates that legislators can cooperate with the Executive, but also that they do not necessarily approve proposals that maximize their chances for reelection. The law -aimed at allowing massive commercialization of forestal resources- was presented by the president and received an unusual expedite approval from the Congress, but later the President and other sectors of the society opposed it. Last week, the law was finally declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (http://www.cambio.com.co/paiscambio/761/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR_CAMBIO-3939296.html). 

 

Why did the president withdraw his support from his own initiative and why did the legislators support the same proposal despite their inclination to blockade the President? From the legislators’ perspective it might have to do with economic incentives: they might have expected considerable rewards from multinational companies for “speeding” the  legislative process up. But the way they did it -by ignoring the constitutional provision to convoke public hearings among the affected population (mostly indigenous and afro-colombian people)- irritated environmentalists and indigenous groups. That in turn gave Uribe an exceptional opportunity to expose the undemocratic ways of his opponents, and at the same time increase his popularity. 

 

These cases are not very common in Colombia, but might be illustrative of how pecuniary incentives may alter the hypothetical outcomes of  the Executive-Legislative relations.