Faith in Chavez starts to wane

Support for Chavez has been decreasing, even among his supporters, according to a recent article in the New York Times. The article cites ongoing economic and social problems as the reasons for increasing criticism of Chavez. Additionally, it says that voters are becoming more and more wary of his moves to expand state control of the economy and society. Chavez’s consolidation of power has guaranteed that he’ll be in office until at least 2011 and there’s no way for the electorate to change that under the current laws, making it so that he has little, if any accountability to the electorate. However, the article raises the issue of divisions within his own party and rising popularity of opposition candidates at the local and state level.

Uribe is Powerful despite Changes in Presidential Decree

Before the 1991 constitutional reform, the Colombian constitution allowed the president to issue decrees under a state of crisis.  However, the criteria for a crisis were not clearly defined and there were no time limits on the decree.  In practice, the president could issue decrees under what he called a “crisis” in order to achieve his own policy preferences.

The 1991 constitution changed these formal powers so that now the Constitutional Court must automatically review declarations of emergency, which provides a check on presidents who wish to abuse the term “crisis.”  Additionally, there is now a 90-day limit on decrees, so they are no longer in place indefinitely.  These changes are important in providing a check on the president, who is forced to bargain with the legislature to accomplish long-term objectives that once were achieved by decree.

However, Uribe has such strong support from his coalition, which holds a majority in Congress, that he is still very capable of achieving his goals without strong decree powers.  His informal power through his coalition and his popularity with voters makes him a very powerful president.  The real power of the constitutional reform only comes into play when the president faces a hostile congress.  In that case, he would be limited in pursuing policy that is not acceptable to the legislature.

Presidential Accountability in Brazil

One aspect of accountability a politician has is held by the party that the politician is apart of. In the United States the party of a politician holds him or her accountable to the ideals of the party and nominates a representative of the party based on how they are planning on upholding those ideals while in office. Yet in Brazil, there is a law called candidato nato, “birthright” which guarantees the re-nomination of an incumbent by their same party (Mainwaring 1991). Yet if the politician is guaranteed to be backed by the party for a re-election, then how can the party hold the politician accountable if he or she does not uphold those ideals of the party sufficiently while in office?

So think about what this means if a president carries the name of specific party, and does not abide completely by the party’s views for the term duration. Does this lead to a blurring of the party lines/what the party stands for?

Coalition Building and New Political Actors in Bolivia

Coalition building among political parties truly began in Bolivia after 1985 when the Siles Sauzo minority government’s gross inefficiencies resulted in hyper-inflation, political polarization, and the threat of destabilizing the government. The three dominant political parties at the time (MNR, MIR, and ADN) saw the only way to keep the government intact was through coalition building, and soon this became the dominant political strategy used by the parties. 

Bolivia has a unique presidential electoral system, where if the President does not win the majority (very difficult in a multi-party system) the Congress determines the winner from the top two candidates. The already entrenched system of clientelism developed deeper and more complex under this process and the negotiations between parties for determining the President led to establishment of greater coalition building.  The parties would negotiate on political appointments, key positions within government, and determine the dominant power base of the government. In addition, under the closed list system electoral system, the leaders of the parties were able to follow through on political appointments that were decide/allocated during the coalition negotiations.

The power to give political appointments combined with the heavy clientelism unfortunately did not help the public and widespread dissent at the real and often perceived corruption led to the rise of “anti-system parties”, specifically the MAS (led by Evo Morales) and the MIP.  Electoral reforms in 1991, 1996, and 2004 culminated in the groundbreaking introduction of allowing independent candidates to run for office-fundamentally changing the incentive structure for parties and the coalition building process. The introduction of new political actors on the political stage in Bolivia in recent years has changed the incentive structure for how parties come together to form coalitions. This has undermined the stability that coalition politics and building has provided to the Bolivian political structure for the past 20 years. The incorporation of these new political actors resulting from the reforms have brought numerous challenges that Bolivia is currently struggling with on its rocky road to democracy. 

 

Anti-drug policy and political coalitions

A primary goal of Calderón upon becoming president was to deal with drug violence in Mexico. Coordination with the U.S. has produced a cooperative agreement regarding information and law enforcement sharing for the purposes of diminishing the negative impact drug trafficking has in both countries. While the PAN lacks an outright majority in both houses of Congress, it can achieve majority by forming a coalition with the PRI. The PRD outright opposes the bill because it would give the U.S. too much of a say of what goes on inside Mexico’s borders, or so it argues. While unhappy, the PRD feels confident that the measure will pass the Mexican Senate.Such a passage would be illustrative of the coalitions necessary for Calderón to form to enact policy.  Because he was elected by a razor thin margin and consistently referred to as illegitimate by the PRD, he must use his informal ability to control political careers for such a progression.  Roig-Franzia, Manuel “In Mexico, Doubts on Anti-Drug Proposal; Some in U.S. Also Express Hesitancy” The Washington Post October 6, 2007 

Accountability in Argentina

 From New York Times, 7/8/01: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07E4DB1238F93BA35754C0A9679C8B63&scp=1&sq=argentina+accountability&st=nyt

The indictment of Carlos Menem, the former president of Argentina, by a federal judge in 2001 demonstrated encouraging advance for legal accountability in a country where the powerful had too often enjoyed impunity from prosecution for their misdeeds.  The level of political accountability in Argentina was extremely low and allowed for great corruption by the country’s leaders.  However, with the indictment of Menem, the courts signaled a change in tolerance for this type of act, and showed that vertical accountability would come to Argentine politics. 

But, before prosectution, Menem left Argentina for Chile, where he was safe from extradition for questioning of his crimes.  In 2004 his arrest warrants were cancelled, paving the way for his return to Argentina.  However, multiple re-election attempts by Menem for Senate and governor failed, possibly showing the growing anti-corruption movement amongst Argentines.