Chile Coalition to Back One Candidate

This article, written in 1988, describes how coalition politics in Chile began to form after Pinochet.  It discusses how the parties united against Pinochet, how they clashed, and how they worked together to rework the constitution and back specific candidates. 

By SHIRLEY CHRISTIAN, SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES

Published: October 15, 1988

LEAD: The 16-party coalition that led opponents of Gen. Augusto Pinochet to victory in last week’s plebiscite announced today that it would back a single candidate in the presidential elections next year.The 16-party coalition that led opponents of Gen. Augusto Pinochet to victory in last week’s plebiscite announced today that it would back a single candidate in the presidential elections next year.The decision seemed to end the possibility that the coalition would split and that the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, the leading elements, would name competing candidates.

”We will work together to assure an effective transition to democracy, to guarantee the stability of the democratic regime and to give broad backing to the government that the people will soon elect,” Patricio Aylwin, president of the Christian Democratic Party, said in announcing the accord.

Members of several parties in the coalition have said recently that an agreement had also been reached that the candidate would come from the Christian Democratic Party, the largest party in Chile. Mr. Aylwin is considered a leading contender. Military Urged to Begin Talks

The announcement today also included a formal appeal to the armed forces to open negotiations on amendments to the Constitution that most of Chile’s political parties, including some that supported General Pinochet, want before the elections. The most crucial, in the eyes of the parties, is to ease the rules for amendment of the Constitution in the future.

General Pinochet’s loss in the one-man plebiscite, in which he sought eight more years in power, means that he must call free elections by the end of next year, then hand over the presidency to his elected successor on March 11, 1990. The rules for the change of power are in the Constitution, written at his direction in 1980.

The statement read by Mr. Aylwin, which was signed by him and leaders of the 15 other parties, said General Pinochet must ‘’separate himself” from power as the result of his plebiscite loss, but it did not make specific demands as to how soon he should do so. Mr. Aylwin also repeated his frequent contention that the opposition wants to avoid a power vacuum.

It is not clear who would oppose the coalition candidate in the elections. There could be more than one candidate from the right or center-right. The Constitution provides for a runoff round of voting if no candidate receives a majority in the first round. Illegal Pinochet Campaign Hinted

Although General Pinochet has recognized his loss and said that he will abide by the Constitution, presumably meaning he intends neither to step aside before March 1990 nor try to hold power beyond that time, some of his closest associates have hinted in recent days that he might try to run in the coming elections.

But several leaders of the parties that supported him, including one constitutional expert, have said he is not eligible because the charter does not allow a president to succeed himself. The exception, they say, would have been a victory in the plebiscite, which was a one-time situation intended as a transitory step toward democracy.

The accord today was seen by many as a historic event because it united two longtime bitter foes, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. The Socialists, now divided into various factions, including a moderate one led by Ricardo Lagos and a more radical one led by former Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda, were the party of Salvador Allende Gossens.

The military came to power after overthrowing Dr. Allende’s Socialist-Communist coalition Government on Sept. 11, 1973.

Presidential Power, Party Politics, and Coalition Building in Panama

Panama is a presidential democracy. The executive branch is composed of the president and two vice presidents elected by plurality for five year terms. The 78 member unicameral legislature is elected in single member plurality in rural areas and in multi-member proportional representation (PR) for urban areas with representatives serving five year terms. Presidential and National Assembly elections are held concurrently and a 1998 referendum blocked presidential reelection.

Behind this straightforward framework interesting constitutional allowances grant the president strong powers in policy making, especially under current circumstances. The president has the authority to appoint the twelve ministers who compose the Cabinet Council who can decree states of emergency and suspend constitutional guarantees, nominate members of the Supreme Court, appoint or remove state governors, and control the budget. Furthermore, the president appoints the high command of the Panamanian Public Force (formerly the military) and has veto power over the legislature (which can be overruled by a 2/3 majority).

The current president, Martin Torrijos Espino of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), is the son of Noriega’a miltarist predecessor Omar Torrijos who established the PRD. Although this creates a military oriented image at first glance, the party has worked hard to distance itself from history and create a center-left platform. The PRD also holds the majority of National Assembly seats (http://electionguide.org/search-results.php?type=&country=167&search_year=any&submitted=1&submit.x=47&submit.y=13&submit=Search) making a coalition a moot point currently. This scenario reinforces the high level of Torrijos’ political power.

Given the PR scheme for the National Assembly, coalition building does have noteworthy potential, especially if a opposition president were elected in 2009 along with a some level of shake up in the National Assembly. In fact, some opposition party melding has recently taken place with the Solidarity Party and National Liberal Party uniting as the new Patriotic Union Party (right leaning I think). However, if a PRD president is elected again, creating a 2/3 majority opposition coalition in the legislature to overide vetoes would be an enormous challenge given the PRD’s record of successfully getting Assembly members elected.

Although there is not time discuss it in detail here, it is interesting to note the political structure allows strong party unity in Panama which helps to explain the consolidation of power by the PRD. Namely, parties nominate those that will run for office and have the power to revoke their power as legislators after they are elected.

Politics in the Shadows

Ecuador’s political deal-making reeks of the big party politics without the observable, public alliances.  This is an artifact of the high level of suspicion most Ecuadorians felt towards mainstream politics.  Individual constituents worry that their elected officials will be swept up with big-party politics and that they will sacrifice the interests of their particular constituency in favor of party-wide goals.  To this end President Mahuad stated that “The worst insult you can tell an Ecuadorian congressperson is be a gobernista.”  (Acosta Pg. 72) 

 

The effect of this suspicion has been back room deal-making between the executive and key members of the legislature.  A key difference between traditional coalition building and ghost coalitions has been the use of sub-cabinet level appointments where the supporters of the executive can gain access to pork through executive agencies, but still maintain their appearance as an outsider, or antigobernista.  A curious offshoot of this is that the coalitions have an indefinite future leading to an unclear endgame.  As we learned in Managerial Economics, without a clear endpoint to a series of rounds, there is a reduced incentive to spoil the game. 

 

As professor Saiegh demonstrated in his spectrograph, we see that many parties actually follow what Acosta calls “coincidence of interests.”  Professor Saiegh posed an unanswered question about why these parties whose interests are so closely aligned, do not merge.  The Ecuadorian case would suggest that such public collusion would invite public distrust and perturb party loyalists.