Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo boast murder rates of 40 and 18 per 100,000 citizens, respectively. Sao Paulo’s rate has dropped from 35 per 100,000 citizens in 1999.
The gangs in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo have real power. In September of 2002, Rio de Janeiro suffered “Black Monday” when schools, stores, offices, markets, and transportation shut down to gang influence. In Sao Paulo, the Primerio Comando da Capital (PCC) staged a multi-prison rebellion in 2001 and orchestrated a five-day wave of violence in May of 2006. Within the state, 150 people were murdered, 82 buses were burned, and 17 bank branches were attacked as more than half of the 140 prisons erupted with rebellions. All organized by mobile phones from prison cells.
The ongoing struggle between the government, police, and Sao Paulo’s main criminal gang (Primeiro Comando da Capital) has and will continue to disrupt public safety. The P.C.C. may control 140,000 prisoners in Sao Paulo alone with another 500,000 supporters outside the prison system. These members produce millions of dollars in monthly fees for the P.C.C. and helped coordinate the chaos in May 2006. The state’s attempt to dissipate the gang’s strength by separating members and imprisoning them in other states has led to a strengthening of the organization nationally.
Sao Paulo implemented reform in 1990 that mandated jail time for selling drugs and has resulted in overcrowded prisons with 35% more prisoners than space. With such high concentrations of drug dealers, the prisons have become gang centers that breed increased levels of violence and insecurity. State officials often fight back with a heavy hand. Sao Paulo’s May 2006 incident resulted in the death of 100 “suspects.”
Brazil’s pardoning labor code protects the jobs of many public servants. Job security and low salaries complement corruption as police are easily enticed by bribes with little fear of losing their job and few incentives to remain clean. State officials have attempted to infiltrate the corrupt police force but only to have them reinstated by court order.
- The Brazil Group
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_GJPJGSG
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=6950391
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9597408
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7922722
http://pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=495&language_id=1
3 responses so far ↓
kpsharp // February 28, 2008 at 6:17 am
More concerns about police corruption…
In December 2006, 82 civil and military officials were arrested on suspicion of gambling and drug trafficking in the Sao Paulo state. Rio’s police force is known to be one of the most brutal in the world. In 2006, 1000 people died in the hands of the state. These police-gang battles will perpetually disrupt public safety until better efforts are made to improve the system.
monicapachon // February 28, 2008 at 7:49 am
Violence in São Paulo and Rio is huge. One could question how is that the national state can help the federal entities to deal with the problem. But it is a turf war between the federal government and the states … who controls the police and the reform to the police force seems like a big issue.
eengelman // February 28, 2008 at 10:58 am
State officials could use federal support to expand the prison system, and increase police force salaries, and weed those out that are found to be corrupt.
Without better incentives the police will continue to fall to corruption. The federal government’s assistance in Rio during the Pan American games brought two weeks of relative peace to the city.
Further federal assistance, in cooperation with state officials, is clearly an opportunity so what is holding this back? Do higher level state officials benefit from prison corruption as well or does it stop at inmates paying off prison guards? In other words, where does the resistance to reform come from besides states uneasiness at federal government encroachment?
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