Andean Crisis is Over

Take a look. Very very interesting — and check out Chavez’s whispers to Daniel Ortega.

Uribe is Powerful despite Changes in Presidential Decree

Before the 1991 constitutional reform, the Colombian constitution allowed the president to issue decrees under a state of crisis.  However, the criteria for a crisis were not clearly defined and there were no time limits on the decree.  In practice, the president could issue decrees under what he called a “crisis” in order to achieve his own policy preferences.

The 1991 constitution changed these formal powers so that now the Constitutional Court must automatically review declarations of emergency, which provides a check on presidents who wish to abuse the term “crisis.”  Additionally, there is now a 90-day limit on decrees, so they are no longer in place indefinitely.  These changes are important in providing a check on the president, who is forced to bargain with the legislature to accomplish long-term objectives that once were achieved by decree.

However, Uribe has such strong support from his coalition, which holds a majority in Congress, that he is still very capable of achieving his goals without strong decree powers.  His informal power through his coalition and his popularity with voters makes him a very powerful president.  The real power of the constitutional reform only comes into play when the president faces a hostile congress.  In that case, he would be limited in pursuing policy that is not acceptable to the legislature.

El Pacto entre Ortega y Aleman

Nicaragua offers an extreme example of legislative alliance between two parties. This case is obviously an opportunistic form of cooperation shaped by Ortega (FSLN) and Aleman (PLC) to control Nicaragua’s politics.”The formation of the bipartisan system that has dominated Nicaragua in recent years began in the late 1980s with the development of a conservative electoral opposition to the revolutionary Sandinista movement. However, the solidification of two-party dominance was not orchestrated until 1999, when a cynical political pact, called el Pacto, was brokered between the two leaders. This undemocratic arrangement, which was negotiated by self-serving political elites to the detriment of the electorate, has been continually characterized by corruption and represents a telling blow to free electoral process and legitimate governance.”(source:http://www.coha.org/2006/08/10/the-upcoming-nicaraguan-elections/ ).

 

The pact made in 1999 gave to the two leaders a strong control over around 90% of the legilslature:”The 1999 political pact between Daniel Ortega and Arnoldo Alemán (president from 1996 – 2001 who is now facing 20 years in jail for fraud and embezzlement) is the culmination of years of political venality from which Nicaraguans are clearly trying to escape with the 2006 election. The agreement united their two parties in the National Assembly and gave Ortega and Alemán control over nearly 90 percent of the legislature – granting the unified duo near dictatorial powers over the nation. The leaders used their majority control for the cynical assertion of conclusive influence over many facets of Nicaraguan public life, including the Supreme Court and the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). [...]The pact also ensured both Ortega and Alemán seats in the national assembly for the next two terms, a position coveted by both men because of the parliamentary immunity that it afforded. Because of this privileged protection, Ortega and Alemán avoided prosecution for various crimes committed in previous years, Ortega for sexual abuse charges and Alemán for fraud and embezzlement. “(source:http://www.coha.org/2006/08/10/the-upcoming-nicaraguan-elections/ )

 

El Pacto has also had effects on the electoral behavior of the parties since: “The Ortega and Alemán-controlled National Assembly passed legislation in January 2000 that increased the electoral threshold for political parties seeking to participate in the National Assembly, further establishing the dominance of the FSLN and the PLC. Lastly, Ortega saw to the passing of legislation through the National Assembly that lowered the percentage necessary to win the presidency in the first round to 35 percent of the popular vote (In the case that no one candidate reaches 35 percent of the vote, the two top candidates are subject to a runoff election). [...]The duopoly created by means of el Pacto, effectively brought about the gutting of Nicaraguan democratic legitimacy. ” (source:http://www.coha.org/2006/08/10/the-upcoming-nicaraguan-elections/ )

 

The pact between the two leaders has collected many critiques and attacks from inside, “Miles de nicaragüenses protestaron ayer en la ciudad de Granada, 90 km al sureste de la capital, contra los ex presidentes Daniel Ortega y Arnoldo Alemán”(source: http://www.diariohorizonte.com/view/articulo.aspx?articleid=2482&zoneid=7) and from outside, the United States have recently condemned this pact declaring that this agreement is a threat to democracy in Nicaragua as well as in the entire region (source:http://www.washingtonvoz.com/spanish/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=127 )

 

http://www.diariohorizonte.com/view/articulo.aspx?articleid=2482&zoneid=7

http://www.coha.org/2006/08/10/the-upcoming-nicaraguan-elections/

http://www.washingtonvoz.com/spanish/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=127

Presidential Power in Peru = Squash the Opposition?

Recently, ex-president Alejandro Toledo (of the Perú Posible party) has accused President Alan García (of APRA) of using his executive powers to “harass” members of the opposition, specifically those who are considering running in the 2011 presidential election.

Toledo has recently returned to Peru to work on strengthening his Perú Posible party. In the last elections, the party only won 2 seats (with 4.10% of the total votes) in the 120-seat unicameral Congress. When last in Lima, Toledo was implicated in a case of governmental mismanagement, specifically in regards to improper use of the presidential plane. Humala Tasso, who was a presidential candidate in 2006 with the Unión por el Perú, is also being charged with corruption (the DA has requested that he be sentenced to 15 years in prison). Both men claim to be victims of presidential harassment.

Peru does have a relatively strong executive. Under the most recent constitution, the President appoints the Prime Minister and also the Council of Ministers (the cabinet). Bills can be proposed by either the executive or the legislature, but the president does have reactive (veto) powers. The president also has proactive (decree) powers, but all presidential bill proposals or decrees must first be approved by the Council of Ministers. (But because the Council is nominally appointed by the president, this does not appear to be a huge block to presidential power.)

According to Toledo’s claims, it could be interpreted that García is attempting to further solidify his personal power as president in anticipation of the upcoming presidential elections. In 2006, García received 30.62% of the votes in the first-round election in April, and then won the contest over Tasso with 52.63% of the votes in June. However, as the judiciary is independent of the executive office, it isn’t certain that the cases brought against Toledo and Tasso are examples of a powerful executive oppressing the opposition.